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Digital Smartphone Tracking for COVID-19
Public Health and Civil Liberties in Tension
Contact investigations have been a vital public health
strategy, most recently in controlling tuberculosis and
sexually transmitted infections including HIV. Yet, the
sheer scale of severe acute respiratory syndrome coro-
navirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) infections poses major chal-
lenges to contact investigations. Strategies in China,
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan have supple-
mented traditionalmanual approacheswith digital sur-
veillance through smartphone applications.
The US has not used digital surveillance as a tool,
but Google, Apple, the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT), as well as 2 pan-European consortia
and a variety of independent efforts are developing
Bluetooth smartphone technology to enable rapid no-
tification of users that they have had a close exposure
to individuals diagnosed with medically verified coro-
navirusdisease2019(COVID-19).Howdoesdigital track-
ingdiffer frommanual tracing?Althoughdigital surveil-
lance has the distinct advantages of scale and speed,
does it confer sufficient public health benefit to justify
adoption given privacy concerns? How do the design
choices of digital contact tracing systems affect public
health and privacy?
ComparingManual and Digital Strategies
Most thoughtful uses of smartphone technologies aug-
ment, butdonot replace,manual tracing. Themost suc-
cessful strategies begin bymassively scaling upmanual
tracing, asMaryland,Massachusetts, andNewYorkhave
recentlydone.1Automatedsystemsaredesigned toadd
informationmore rapidly andare scalable to largepopu-
lations. Traditional tracing begins with reporting to the
healthdepartment,which thenassesses risk, asksdiag-
nosed patients for their known contacts, and notifies
contacts of potential exposure, all by telephone call or
in person.2 Although patients are not usually obligated
to disclose their contacts, and health officials do not in-
form contacts of the patient’s name, in some instances
those informed can infer who the index patient is.
By contrast, digital tracing rapidly notifies users if
they have been in close proximity with a person medi-
cally diagnosed with COVID-19. By design, these sys-
temswill have layers of privacy protection. Digital trac-
ing will detect proximity, not geographic location,
avoidingcentralizeddatabasesofwheresmartphoneus-
ershave traveled.Moreover,downloadingandusing the
smartphone application is voluntary. As a result of re-
centcollaborativeeffortsbyAppleandGoogle, individu-
alswith iOSorAndroid smartphoneswouldhave theop-
tion to turn on tracing similar to the user option to turn
onor off location services. The technique for determin-
ing proximity relies on anonymous signals (called
“chirps”) sent back and forth between phones. Chirps
containno identifying information,safeguardinguserpri-
vacy. An individual’s COVID-19diagnosis is not revealed
except to the public health authorities.3
Digital systemscouldempowerusers ifpublichealth
agencieshaveoversightofthesystems.AppleandGoogle
plans to authorize use of their applications only if health
authorities approve. Health officials would definemedi-
callysignificantexposure(distanceandtime),healthmes-
sagestoidentifiedcontactsregardingself-isolation,symp-
tomchecks,andnotificationofmedical andpublichealth
personnel.Thepublicwouldhavetobeassuredandtrust
that Apple, Google, and public health personnel would
never use the data for any other purpose.
User Controlled vs Centralized Approaches
Twocontrastingapproachestodigitalcontacttracinghave
emerged: a more centralized approach favored by gov-
ernments in China, South Korea, Taiwan, and elsewhere
andadecentralized,user-centricapproachsupportedby
the jointApple-Google systemand favoredbysome,but
not all, European countries (eTable in the Supplement).
China, for example, combined government surveillance
of the location histories for individuals to create infec-
tion risk scoring systems, andnowrequires its citizens to
score “green” to enter public facilities, workplaces, or
travel.SouthKorea’sdigitalsurveillanceuses lawenforce-
ment and fines to sanction individualswho violate quar-
antine or social distancing orders. Taiwan added smart-
phonelocationtrackingtodetectandsanctionquarantine
violations. Israel initially used national security legal au-
thorityfortheMinistryofHealthtoimplementdigitaltrack-
ing,butrecentlytheIsraeliHighCourtofJusticefoundthat
the surveillance, conducted as itwasunder anexecutive
order and absent legislative approval, lacked adequate
legal basis to continue.4-6 Importantly, every successful
implementation of digital systems relied also on well-
resourcedandrapidlydeployedmanualcontacttracing.7
A divide has emerged in Europe over the design of
automated tracing systems. Countries agree that digi-
tal systems are needed to automatically identify con-
tacts of infected individuals but disagree about how
muchpersonal informationhealthauthorities should re-
ceive without individual consent. Some governments
(eg, France, Italy, and theUK) favormore centralization
in which public health departments immediately re-
ceive personal information about identified contacts.
Other governments (eg,Austria, Estonia,Germany, and
Switzerland) favor decentralization following a design
from a group of European academics called DT-3P in
which contacts receivenotificationof their proximity to
infectedpeople, buthealth authorities arenotifiedonly
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if the individual chooses to do so. The Apple, Google, and MIT de-
signsarealignedwith thisdecentralizedapproach. In theUS, the fed-
eral government has yet to announce a nationwide policy.
Optimal Design: Balancing Health and Privacy
Despitescientificuncertainty,digital systemscouldsignificantlycon-
tribute to curtailing the spread of SARS-CoV-2 infection if adopted
widely and integrated into comprehensivepublic health strategies.
Ultimately, theremay be trade-offs between public health efficacy
and privacy-enhancing features.
Digital tracing should augment traditional public health strate-
gies but cannot replace them. Primary public health strategies in-
cludewidescalepopulationtesting,manualtracing,isolation,andquar-
antine.Socialdistancingalsoremains importantformitigatingspread
and maintaining health system capacities. As important as opening
theeconomymaybe,overrelianceondigital trackingalonewill result
in a resurgenceof cases and increased stress on thehospital system.
Digital systemscannot effectively augment traditionalmethods
without widespread uptake. A recent simulation suggests the
COVID-19pandemic canbe suppressedwith80%of all smartphone
usersutilizingtheapplication,or56%oftheoverallpopulation.8Avol-
untary systemwithout effective incentives is unlikely to achieve suf-
ficient uptake, although partial benefits could accrue at lower levels
ofuptake.EarlyresultsfromSingapore’svoluntarysystemhaveshown
only 20% of the population had installed the application as of April
21, 2020.9 The US public is unlikely to accept mandates to imple-
ment digital tracing, even in a health emergency. Maintaining public
trust remains a vital component of COVID-19 pandemic control.
Because a criticalmass of userswill not be in the network at the
requisite time, and some individuals will not register a COVID-19 di-
agnosis, digital systemsalone cannot ensure safety. Public health of-
ficials must educate the public about the deficiencies of voluntary
tracking systems. Otherwise, the public could gain a false sense of
security,whichcouldencourage increasedrisk-takingbehaviors.The
average user, not knowing the size of the network or sharing rates,
will find it difficult to interpret feedback from the digital application.
Althoughdigital trackinghasbeendesignedasapublichealthtool,
it will be important to avoid secondary uses, such as in the work-
place, law enforcement, or immigration. Employers may ask for re-
sults from smartphone applications as a condition of return towork.
Hospitals might consider results in prioritizing testing and treat-
ment. Neither is warranted given the current state of the technol-
ogy.Ensuringrobust legalprotectionagainstprivacy invasionsandun-
authorized usewill enhance social acceptance of digital systems.
Onceanapplication is in thepublicsphere, it couldremaina long-
term feature in the smartphone environment. To avoid long-term
uses, so-called function creep, especially for nonpublic health pur-
poses, federal or stateauthorization fordigital applications couldbe
tied to thedurationofCOVID-19emergencydeclarationswithanau-
tomatic sunset in place. Applications could also be designed to au-
tomaticallyuninstall after a fixedperiodand thepersonaldata could
be automatically erased.
Trade-off Between Civil Liberties and Public Health
Although it is conceivable to envisage public health and civil liber-
ties as synergistic, they often are in tension. To improve uptake,
governments could mandate or incentivize use of these technolo-
giesandpermitdatausesbyemployersandbusinesses. Statehealth
departments could also seekaccess todigital data forwider surveil-
lancepurposes.Given the current evidencebasebehind thesedigi-
tal methods, it would be premature tomandate their use, thus the
trade-offbetweenprivacyandautonomyforuncertainpublichealth
benefits. Incentives seem more plausible. Widespread deploy-
ment would only be warranted if pilot projects andmodeling offer
sufficient scientific evidence toassesspublic healthefficacyagainst
privacy and other costs.
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